No friends, no cards

The EU has become increasingly isolated as it has pursued a foreign policy in profound disregard of altered economic and geopolitical realities

In recent years, the European Union has found itself in a difficult position. Its economy has stagnated after the EU hit its own industry with badly designed transition projects and self-defeating sanctions against third countries. Brexit broke the spell of the irreversibility of integration, and further enlargement is not forthcoming, despite the ritualistic, mantra-like promises repeated for decades to candidate countries notably in the Western Balkans.

The mainstay of EU foreign policy — supporting Ukraine in a conflict to defeat Russia — has turned into a quagmire of sunk costs with little hope of success. And recently, the United States criticized the EU as “weak” and “decaying”, urged Europeans to spend exorbitant sums on armaments, imposed tariffs, and, to add insult to injury, asked Denmark to cede Greenland.

In February 2025, in his exchanges with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, US President Donald Trump remarked that Ukraine did “not have the cards right now”. Trump’s poker analogy uncovers an uncomfortable truth of power politics: Does the EU hold any cards?

The EU has lost much of the “soft power” it previously enjoyed. Relations with China have soured, marked by trade disputes, technology restrictions and the EU leaders’ prevailing mindset of strategic rivalry. In much of the Muslim world, the EU’s political and material support for Israel amid its genocidal actions in Gaza has generated deep resentment. Many African countries, meanwhile, are strengthening ties with Russia or China, which they view as more reliable economic and strategic partners. European institutions have, in recent years, consistently prioritized confrontation over cooperation, neglected the concerns of the Global South, and applied international law inconsistently, which has weakened Europe’s credibility and international influence. Any serious commitment to diplomacy has been set aside; in its place, the EU has pursued a foreign policy marked by moral absolutism, reminiscent of the missionary zeal of earlier eras, in profound disregard of altered economic and geopolitical realities.

A weakened Europe may serve the US’ strategic interests, notably in line with Zbigniew Brzezinski’s objective of preventing a cohesive Eurasian rival, as outlined in his book The Grand Chessboard, but it does not serve Europe itself. A weak, isolated and strategically incoherent Europe undermines the welfare, sovereignty and long-term prospects of its member states and their citizens.

This brings us to a simple principle: with no friends, the EU has no cards. Without allies and trusted partners, Europe lacks standing and the capacity to defend its interests effectively. Restoring credibility and rebuilding trust with key global actors is not merely desirable. In a multipolar world, it is indispensable. Diversifying partnerships is the only way to rebalance Europe’s relationship with the US. Without it, Europe risks sliding into irreversible vassalization, a trajectory that, given the choices of European leaders, appears increasingly intentional.

There are two broad paths ahead.

The first is the continuation of current policy: accepting humiliation, tolerating unfair trade deals, submitting to militarization and remaining dependent on the US for technology and energy. Under this approach, Europe aligns fully with the US, allows itself to be drawn into bloc building that primarily serves the US’ interests, and hopes this will ease pressure and restore normality. This is the strategy of the current European Parliament majority. The mainstream groups embrace it out of desperation, with the hope that globalist forces will replace Trump in 2028 with someone who will return US-EU relations to business as usual. The Trumpists on the so-called far right, on the other hand, embrace Trump’s policies vis-a-vis Europe with exultation, hoping he will help them oust the EU mainstream and make Europe great again. Both groups, albeit with different attitudes, will achieve the same failure: strategic weakening of the EU and worsened EU relations with the wider international community.

The EU majority has been repeatedly bullied yet returns to the abuser. The experience of many countries in the Global South vis-a-vis the US over recent decades demonstrates that appeasement does not moderate behavior; it incentivizes further pressure and produces greater dependence. Persisting along this path will leave Europe weak, reactive and structurally incapable of defending its own interests. The need to diversify is particularly pressing for Central and Eastern Europe. For example, Germany’s slowing economy limits export opportunities for regional businesses, making reliance on traditional markets risky.

By contrast, states that resist pressure, independently or through diversified partnerships, consistently achieve more favorable outcomes.

While no majority currently supports this approach, opposition to the status quo exists on both the left and the right. Various left-wing movements call for strategic autonomy, anti-imperial foreign policies and closer ties between Europe and the Global South. On the right, some patriots look to Charles de Gaulle’s vision of “Europe des patries”, a vision of sovereign states that also supports Europe reclaiming strategic autonomy. Though relatively small, both camps show that a broader coalition in favor of Europe’s long-term interests is possible.

Yet another possible path is a “two-speed Europe”. In this scenario, the EU’s center, including the European Commission and mainstream parties, maintains its almost exclusive orientation to the transatlantic “special relationship” despite its shortfalls. Meanwhile, other member states, most probably those of Central Europe, pursue balanced independence, keeping the single market of the EU, maintaining constructive relations with the US, but simultaneously deepening ties with Global South economies and exploring alternative trade, energy and technological partnerships. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s opening to the East, which has attracted Chinese companies such as BYD and CATL to Hungary, illustrates the potential of such multipolar engagement: billions in foreign investment and thousands of new jobs.

A two-speed Europe would also allow member states to pursue strategies that reflect their distinct traditions, political preferences and economic realities. The EU was created to serve its members, not to impose uniform models or punish dissent, as it has increasingly done. Therefore, a more pluralistic EU that accepts strategic and cultural diversity rather than enforcing a singular vision is truer to the union’s founding logic, and more genuinely “European” in spirit.

By allowing different strategies to coexist and compete, such an arrangement would further demonstrate in practice which approaches are best suited to rebalancing relations with the US, enhancing stability, and delivering greater prosperity to Europe’s citizens. And it may in turn help other European countries realize the realities and opportunities of the multipolar world order.

In conclusion, the EU must confront a stark reality: its current course has left it friendless, weak and unable to defend its interests. Continuing down the path of subordination and dependency will only deepen this predicament. By diversifying partnerships, cultivating ties with the Global South and taking control of their own destinies, European states can reclaim influence, regain credibility and secure their future in a multipolar world. In international politics, those who stand alone are destined to be sidelined. And while certain EU leaders may deserve to be sidelined, Europe cannot afford to be sidelined along with them.

The author is a member of the European Parliament.

The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.