Maritime provocations will cause trouble for Manila

In recent weeks, the South China Sea has seen a noticeable rise in maritime friction, driven largely by the Philippines' increasingly assertive actions. As the rotating chair of ASEAN in 2026, Manila had a clear opportunity to foster dialogue, promote regional solidarity, and advance the long-stalled negotiations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Instead, it has pursued a multi-pronged strategy of military escalation, infrastructure militarization on occupied features, and political mobilization that risks turning the region into a flashpoint. From hyping a so-called hybrid warfare narrative to expanding large-scale exercises with external powers and upgrading facilities on disputed islands and reefs, these steps have complicated efforts to maintain peace and stability, casting a shadow over the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the broader goal of turning the waters into a sea of peace, friendship, and cooperation.

The Philippines has framed its actions as purely defensive responses to perceived threats, yet recent developments reveal a systematic campaign to alter the status quo in its favor. On May 14, Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner warned of facing "political war, economic war, and information war" in the South China Sea, urging the country to adopt a wartime mindset even in the absence of direct military conflict. Philippine forces reported tracking 35 Chinese vessels between May 4 and 11 across key areas, including 17 near Huangyan Dao— among them nine China Coast Guard ships and eight People's Liberation Army Navy vessels — as well as others near Ren'ai Jiao, Xianbin Jiao, and Zhongye Dao. Rather than viewing these as routine patrols and law enforcement operations, Manila portrayed them as threats, using the monitoring data to justify further militarization. This rhetoric has been accompanied by concrete steps, such as the recent arrival of the second Korean-built offshore patrol vessel, BRP Rajah Lakandula, at Subic Bay, and the navy's announcement of plans to bolster anti-submarine warfare capabilities through new frigates, AW-159 Wildcat helicopters, fixed underwater sensors, and integrated multi-domain systems. These moves signal a clear intent to shift from defensive posture to sustained forward presence.

At the same time, the just-concluded "Balikatan 2026" exercises marked a sharp departure from previous iterations that emphasized humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. For the first time, Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force fired Type 88 shore-to-ship missiles from Philippine soil, successfully sinking the decommissioned BRP Quezon, while US forces contributed HIMARS rocket systems, NMESIS expeditionary ship-intercept systems, and other advanced platforms. Philippine FA-50PH fighters and A-29 attack aircraft also participated in live-fire strikes. Involving more than 17,000 troops from the Philippines, the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada, the drills tested multi-domain integration in ways that clearly targeted a specific regional actor. In parallel, Manila is accelerating illegal infrastructure upgrades on features it occupies in the Nansha Islands. Satellite imagery confirms ongoing work to extend the runway on Zhongye Dao from 1.3 kilometers to 1.5 kilometers, alongside construction of a new sheltered harbor funded by substantial budget allocations continuing into 2026. Port expansion on Mahuan Dao is also underway to improve supply and rotation capabilities. Although Philippine officials describe these projects as civilian initiatives for resupply and fisheries support, they plainly enhance military presence, patrol endurance, and maritime situational awareness.

Politically, Manila is actively mobilizing a "whole-of-government, whole-of-society" approach to confront China. Senators Francis Pangilinan and Bong Go have publicly called on government officials, civil society organizations, academics, media outlets, and private-sector representatives to visit the so-called Kalayaan Island Group to "assert sovereignty" and build national awareness. Such appeals, coupled with recent visits to Zhongye Dao and the activation of new coast guard command facilities there, have further inflamed nationalist sentiment and encouraged provocative civilian activities in disputed waters. These domestic efforts are inseparable from growing external backing. The United States and Japan have stepped up arms transfers and joint training, with Japan considering exports of Type 88 missiles, Abukuma-class frigates, and TC-90 aircraft following its relaxed defense export rules. Washington has approved Bell 505 helicopters and is assisting in building Philippine multi-domain capabilities focused on maritime awareness, cyber defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Agreements for visiting forces with Canada and New Zealand, along with Germany's newly ratified defense cooperation pact and ongoing talks on a Visiting Forces Agreement, have brought additional external actors into the picture under the banner of a "rules-based order" and "freedom of navigation".

Even as Manila promotes tourism roadshows in Beijing and Chengdu to attract Chinese visitors under a new 14-day visa waiver, it simultaneously seeks to internationalize the dispute through proposals for an ASEAN Maritime Center hosted in the Philippines and pushes for revisions to the ASEAN Charter. The contradiction is striking: economic engagement with China is welcomed in one breath, while military alignment with outside powers and efforts to split ASEAN unity are pursued in the next. These provocative actions and external interference have produced serious consequences. Large-scale drills crowd sea and air spaces, raising the risk of miscalculation and accidental conflict. Progress on the COC — already stalled on key issues such as geographic scope, binding force, and dispute resolution mechanisms — has been further hampered despite Manila's chairmanship. ASEAN centrality is being tested as external agendas gain traction, weakening the organization's ability to manage regional affairs independently.

China has exercised a high degree of restraint throughout. Its vessels conduct lawful patrols and law enforcement activities within its sovereign waters and maritime rights and interests, and the 35 ships monitored by the Philippines were engaged in normal operations with no "coercive or aggressive actions" occurring during the Balikatan period. Beijing consistently advocates resolving differences through direct dialogue and consultation with the countries concerned on the basis of historical facts and international law, while firmly rejecting the illegal 2016 arbitration award. Peace and stability in the South China Sea serve the common interests of all littoral states and the wider international community. Manila should abandon the illusion that external military backing can resolve complex sovereignty and maritime issues. Returning to the DOC framework, earnestly advancing COC negotiations without external disruption, and addressing disputes directly with China through peaceful consultation would align with the region's desire for development over confrontation.

Provocative actions that rely on outside powers ultimately harm the Philippines' own long-term interests and the broader ASEAN community. The South China Sea should remain a sea of peace, friendship, and cooperation — a goal that requires all parties to choose dialogue over division and restraint over escalation.

The author is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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