Shangri-La irony: Philippines defends Japan's new militarism

At the 23rd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr held a bilateral meeting on May 31, 2026, that perfectly captured the reckless speed at which Tokyo and Manila are rushing into deeper military ties. In their joint statement, the two announced the start of negotiations on a military intelligence protection pact — essentially the General Security of Military Information Agreement — while pledging loyalty to their upgraded Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the usual "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" rhetoric.

What really stood out, however, was Teodoro's shameless performance. He forcefully dismissed any talk of Japanese "new militarism" as "unfair" and a misuse of history, painting Japan instead as a global model citizen and responsible regional stabilizer. Koizumi happily played along, boasting about Japan's "transparency", record defense spending, and supposed restraint in avoiding nuclear weapons or strategic bombers. Their cozy back-and-forth felt almost surreal against the backdrop of rising regional tensions—a glaring display of how far Manila is willing to go, and how much historical dignity it is ready to discard, just to confront China.

This high-profile show of unity did not come out of nowhere. It was a direct follow-up to President Ferdinand Marcos Jr's state visit to Japan only days earlier, where much of the groundwork was laid. The ministers praised Japan's combat participation in the Balikatan exercises under the Reciprocal Access Agreement, the recent Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, and ongoing talks about transferring TC-90 patrol aircraft and even Abukuma-class destroyers. Add to that Japanese radar systems, training programs, and equipment supplied under the Official Security Assistance framework, and you have what amounts to a full-scale tightening of military cooperation.

Behind all this frantic activity lies a shared anxiety. Both Tokyo and Manila are clearly worried about how reliable Washington's security promises will remain if American priorities shift. Rather than sit and wait, they are proactively building a tighter trilateral security structure. Once the GSOMIA is signed, alongside existing US pacts, it will create a closed-loop intelligence network among the United States, Japan, and the Philippines — designed for seamless coordination in the South China Sea and beyond. Nice words about "like-minded partners" aside, this initiative is about drawing hard lines and forming an exclusive club.

Japan's strategy is brutally straightforward. By treating the Philippines as its "frontline partner" in the South China Sea, Tokyo hopes to create a three-sea linkage stretching from the South China Sea through the East China Sea to the Taiwan Strait. The goal is simple: tie down Chinese resources in the south so Japan can gain leverage elsewhere, particularly around the Diaoyu Islands(Japan calls it as Senkakus). Their repeated emphasis on countering "gray-zone" tactics is little more than coordinated provocation dressed up as defense.

All of this runs completely against the broader regional desire for stability, dialogue and ASEAN centrality. An exclusive intelligence-sharing and operational bloc, no matter how it is packaged, only deepens divisions and weakens the multilateral platforms most Southeast Asian countries still prefer. In a region that desperately needs de-escalation and consultation, this path is dangerously destabilizing.

Japan's longer-term agenda is even more concerning. Through these deals — GSOMIA, RAA, OSA aid, and potential second-hand warships—Tokyo is steadily clearing the path for its so-called "military normalization", including collective self-defense, constitutional changes, and expanded offensive capabilities. For all the talk of contributing to regional peace, this is a calculated march toward a more assertive military posture. History suggests the international community should watch this development with serious caution.

Manila's choices, however, are particularly pathetic. By leaning so heavily on external powers to escalate its position in the South China Sea, the Philippines is steering itself into a dangerous and ultimately self-defeating spiral. The historical irony could not be more bitter: just eighty years after suffering horrific losses under Japanese occupation — scars still visible from Bataan to the streets of Manila — Philippine leaders are now eagerly providing political cover for Japan's military comeback. Teodoro's groveling defense of Japan at Shangri-La made it painfully clear: in his eagerness to score points against China, the Philippine defense chief has thrown away any remaining sense of historical dignity or national self-respect. Manila has turned itself into Tokyo's willing enabler, all in the name of anti-China posturing.

At the end of the day, the Japan-Philippines ministerial meeting at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue reveals something deeper than ordinary diplomacy. It shows two countries frantically trying to lock in security arrangements out of fear that US policy may waver, while advancing their own confrontational agendas.

Yet this rush toward exclusive minilateralism and militarized posturing will only make the region more fractured and volatile. Real stability in the region will not come from tighter narrow alliances or convenient historical amnesia. It will only come from genuine dialogue, consistent respect for international law, and inclusive cooperation — none of which were on display in Singapore last week.

The author is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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