New quality partnership
Uzbekistan's 35 years of independence demonstrate that sovereignty and international cooperation are not mutually exclusive
The year 2026 marks the 35th anniversary of Uzbekistan's independence. This date represents the long journey of a state that gained the right to determine its own development, build relations with the world and assume responsibility for its future. The development of relations between Uzbekistan and China is particularly instructive.
Over the past 35 years, China has evolved from one of the first states to recognize Uzbekistan's independence to become the country's largest trade and economic partner, a major investor and a participant in large-scale infrastructure, industrial and technological projects. Yet the central question concerns more than the number of agreements signed or the volume of trade. It is far more important to understand the new quality this partnership is acquiring and how it relates to the national interests of an independent Uzbekistan.
The partnership reflects a high degree of political trust and a shared intention to ensure the resilience of cooperation regardless of shifts in the international environment. At the same time, it does not imply the creation of a closed alliance or any restriction on Uzbekistan's relations with other states.
This is an important political quality of the Uzbekistan-China partnership. It is built on respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and the right of every nation to choose its own path of modernization. The two countries differ in their systems of government, historical experience and scale, but these differences do not impede cooperation when sovereign equality remains its foundation.
Openness is not the opposite of sovereignty. The experience of independent Uzbekistan allows us to speak of the principle of sovereign openness. Its meaning is straightforward: the state expands its trade, investment, technological and humanitarian ties while retaining the right to determine their direction and align them with the objectives of national development.
China is now Uzbekistan's largest trading partner. According to preliminary national statistics, China accounted for 21.2 percent of the country's foreign trade turnover in 2025 — approximately $17.2 billion. These figures demonstrate the scale of interaction. They also require careful analysis of the structure of trade rather than simple satisfaction with the results achieved.
Uzbekistan imports machinery, equipment, components and technologies from China that are essential to the modernization of its economy. A high volume of such imports is not inherently negative. The decisive question is whether the equipment acquired translates into higher national productivity, the training of engineers, the development of service enterprises, the localization of components and the expansion of Uzbekistan's own exports.
This is why the quality of cooperation matters more than simple arithmetic. When external resources generate new knowledge, skilled employment and modern industries within the country, interdependence strengthens sovereignty. When cooperation primarily entrenches the import of finished goods and the export of raw materials, however, the risk of structural vulnerability increases.
The production of BYD electric vehicles in Uzbekistan may offer an illustrative example. Its strategic impact will be determined not only by the number of vehicles produced, but also by the depth of localization, the participation of domestic suppliers, the training of technical specialists and the ability to enter third-country markets. The same logic applies to solar and wind energy. Long-term results depend not only on generating capacity brought online, but also on local equipment production, the transfer of expertise, environmental responsibility and the ability of Uzbek specialists to maintain new systems independently.
Transport connectivity is equally important. Uzbekistan is one of only two doubly landlocked countries in the world — countries separated from the sea by the territories of other landlocked states. For such a country, reliable access to external markets is not merely an economic question, but an element of strategic autonomy.
From this perspective, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway carries significance far beyond the transport sector. An intergovernmental agreement on the project was signed in June 2024, and a ceremony marking the start of construction was held in December of the same year. The new railway is expected to shorten the route between China and Central Asia and open additional connections to the markets of South and West Asia.
There is, however, a fundamental distinction between a transit route and a development corridor. Transit generates freight flows and related revenues, but it does not by itself transform the structure of an economy. A development corridor emerges only when logistics centers, industrial zones, processing facilities, educational institutions, service companies and modern customs systems are established along the railway.
Uzbekistan's national interest lies not merely in increasing the number of trains crossing its territory. More important is the creation of a productive ecosystem around the new railway.
The project also demonstrates Central Asia's growing agency. Its implementation requires the interests of three states to be coordinated. China provides a substantial share of the market, capital and technology; Kyrgyzstan provides the crucial geographic section; and Uzbekistan connects the route to subsequent western and southern corridors. The participants' mutual dependence creates a foundation for equitable consultation and shared responsibility for the outcome.
Uzbekistan-China relations extend beyond the bilateral level. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the China-Central Asia mechanism provide broader platforms for regional cooperation. Their significance will depend in part on whether Central Asian states can develop a coordinated vision on transport, trade, energy, water resources and digital connectivity.
For Chinese partners, it is essential to view Uzbekistan not only as a market, a transit territory or a source of resources, but also as a co-author of a new regional order. Joint projects will be more sustainable if they are assessed not only in terms of financial returns and transport capacity, but also by their contribution to industrialization, employment, environmental security and human-capital development.
A resilient partnership also requires stronger ties between universities, researchers and citizens. Confucius Institutes operate in Tashkent and Samarkand, while joint educational programs and research centers continue to develop. The Uzbek language is taught at Beijing Foreign Studies University. The visa-free regime that entered into force on June 1, 2025, allowing visits of up to 30 days, has created additional opportunities for tourism, entrepreneurship, academic contacts and direct interaction between the peoples of the two countries. The next stage should focus on the joint production of knowledge through research cooperation, academic exchanges and stronger ties between think tanks.
The political meaning of the Uzbekistan-China partnership lies in demonstrating that states of different sizes can build enduring cooperation without compromising sovereign equality.
The author is an associate professor at Mirzo Ulugbek National University of Uzbekistan.
The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.































