Smoke and mirrors
Tokyo seeks excuses for its military creep into South China Sea via double dealing on law, overstepping its defense- oriented policy and wrapping motives in cooperation
In July 2026, to mark the 10th anniversary of the so-called "South China Sea arbitration award", Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi issued a statement endorsing the "award" and criticizing China's position on the South China Sea. Japan also joined the United States, the Philippines and several other countries in issuing a joint statement on the issue.
Although Japan is neither a South China Sea littoral state nor a party to the maritime disputes, it has portrayed China's rejection of the so-called 2016 "South China Sea arbitration award" as "disregarding" peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms and a "challenge" to the international rule of law. This formulation is built on deliberate factual and legal distortions. In 2006, China made a declaration under Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), excluding disputes concerning maritime delimitation and certain other matters from compulsory dispute settlement procedures. This is an explicit right conferred upon all UNCLOS States Parties. By declining to accept or participate in the so-called 2016 arbitration, China was exercising a legitimate right enshrined in UNCLOS, rather than rejecting the convention itself.
At the same time, the tribunal was established without legitimacy and was politicized from its very inception.
The tribunal assumed jurisdiction over a delimitation dispute that had been lawfully excluded, clearly exceeding its mandate by doing so. Its so-called award rendered through this ultra-vires proceeding is illegal and thus null and void. Ever since its release, it has drawn criticism from international law scholars in China and elsewhere.
Japan's current rhetoric, meanwhile, strips the rule of law of its normative essence and applies blatant double standards to legal benchmarks, most glaringly in the Okinotori controversy. Tokyo refuses to acknowledge Okinotori as a rock and refuses to submit the dispute to third-party adjudication, while backing the designation of Taiping Island as a mere rock. Japan does not uphold the so-called legal standards enshrined in the award; it only cherry-picks arbitrary assertions in the document that can be weaponized to pressure China. Treating international law as a divisible, selective tool suggests that Japan reveres not international law itself, but only the geopolitical gains it can extract from twisting legal rules.
A side-by-side comparison of the evolution of Japan's official statements over the years with the timeline of its geopolitical ambitions reveals a clear parallel trajectory. In the immediate aftermath of the award and the years following, Japan publicly styled itself as a defender of the international order without invoking the label of a "stakeholder".
In 2023, the Philippines became the first recipient of Japan's Official Security Assistance (OSA) program. In 2025, the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement entered into force, establishing a legal framework for Japan's Self-Defense Forces to enter the Philippines and conduct agreed cooperative activities, including joint exercises. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement signed in 2026 further strengthens Japan's logistical support framework in the country. Meanwhile, Japan has held island-retaking drills and conducted a missile firing in the Philippines — marking the first time Japan has launched surface-to-ship missiles overseas since World War II. A full military intervention chain targeting the South China Sea has thus taken shape, spanning legal deployment channels, logistics support, forward surveillance and firepower projection.
In Tokyo's earlier statements on the South China Sea, the term "stakeholder" did not figure in its self-description. In 2025, it appeared in a generic formulation referring to "stakeholders". This year, Japan went further, rebranding itself as a "legitimate stakeholder". The change in Japan's rhetoric aligns perfectly with the formation of this military architecture. Notably, the statement issued by the Japanese foreign minister marking the 10th anniversary of the so-called "South China Sea arbitration award" stated that Japan has expanded maritime cooperation through Official Development Assistance and OSA while strengthening ties with the defense authorities and coast guard agencies of relevant countries. This lays bare a fact — Japan intervenes in the South China Sea not because it holds legitimate rights and interests; instead, it claims such "legitimate" status retroactively to justify its already-underway military creep.
From a broader geopolitical perspective, external factors also fuel Japan's assertive posture. Japan views the South China Sea and Southeast Asia as pivotal theaters for its "Indo-Pacific" strategy. As the United States pursues strategic retrenchment in the region and urges its allies to shoulder more defense burdens along its so-called first island chain, Japan has moved beyond its long-standing provision of economic aid to the Philippines in favor of military cooperation. This shift serves two goals: one is to demonstrate its capacity to serve as a frontline anchor of the US-led "Indo-Pacific" framework, and the other to secure external endorsement for further easing the constraints of its exclusively defense-oriented policy.
The ongoing negotiations between Japan and the Philippines to demarcate maritime boundaries announced on May 28, 2026 follow the same strategic logic. Their ultimate aim is to link the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait into an interconnected defense line to squeeze China's overall strategic space. For Japan, the South China Sea acts both as a testing ground for potential intervention in the Taiwan Strait and a venue to trial its relaxed arms export rules and overseas military deployments.
Japan's wars of aggression against China and its southward expansion brought catastrophic suffering to Asian people. The Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation explicitly required Japan to return all territories seized from China — a core legal basis for China's recovery of the South China Sea islands and a cornerstone of the post-World War II international order. Japan has repeatedly pledged to abide by the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation and ought to respect the postwar order. Yet more than eight decades later, Japan has returned to the South China Sea under the guise of a "stakeholder", reinserting territories it once seized by force into its military network under the banner of "security cooperation".
Ironically, while Japan proclaimed in the joint statement its strong opposition to "destabilizing or unilateral actions including by force or coercion that threaten peace and stability in the region", it is Tokyo itself that has steadily ramped up its military presence and intervention in the South China Sea. Every accusation Japan levels against China is applicable to its own behavior.
What is more, Japan's narrative is losing credibility. Among the signatories to this year's joint statement, only the Philippines is a South China Sea littoral state. Japan, a distant extra-regional power, has been particularly fixated on the discredited award. This suggests that Japan's tactic of wrapping its ambitions in legal and rule-based rhetoric has failed to win recognition from the very maritime region it claims to safeguard.
Historical war crimes will not fade with the passage of time, nor can military expansion be legitimized under the pretext of "security cooperation". China's resolve to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests remains unshakable. Any scheme to disrupt regional peace under the cover of the illegal arbitration award is doomed to failure.
Wang Yichen is a deputy research professor at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies at the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Wu Huaizhong is the deputy director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
The authors contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.
