Many liberal economists who preach "economic determinism" wonder why the trade ties between China and Japan are unable to result in political rapprochement. Premier Wen Jiabao's upcoming visit to Tokyo next month could in fact provide the key to this normalization. However, it is unlikely to be based on economic determinism, but rather, on political imperatives.
Wen's visit should in turn prepare for President Hu Jintao's official visit to Japan later this year, just as rumors already abound that China may issue a special invitation to Japan's Crown Prince Naruhito and Crown Princess Masako to be special guests at the official opening of the Beijing Olympics in August 2008.
Rapprochement between the two countries may have started in earnest, but to fully understand the highly emotional and long-standing conflicting relationship, one has to go back 3,500 years, back to Japan's Jomon period and China's Yin Dynasty (about 1,500 BC), when the first contacts were purportedly established between the two sides.
It was then a relationship of "cultural unequals", lasting until the "golden age" of the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907) and the Nara period when relations were based on deep cultural exchanges. Relations then were relatively stable as the mighty Tang Dynasty exerted its cultural influence on the Japanese isles.
However, the first conflict also took place between them in AD 663, when Tang China and the Korean Kingdom of Silla fought against the small kingdoms in Japan and the Pakeche Kingdom of Korea. Song China then increased "cultural transfers" to Japan, especially in terms of lifestyle.
But the first cultural and philosophical "distanciation" began taking place in the post-Tang and Hei'an/Kyoto period (late 7th century).
The Ming Dynasty-Marunouchi period (14th century) began a normalization of relations in 1398, with the first Ming envoy arriving in Japan in 1402. Two Korean expeditions were also launched in 1592 and 1597, with Japan beginning to "threaten" China. The Edo period in Japan (1603) then installed koku-gaku or "national learning" in Japan, which saw a truly distinctive Japanese culture emerging vis--vis China.
The Meiji period, which began in 1868, was Japan's decisive turn towards the West and a further "distanciation" from Chinese civilization. Clearly, Japan established Shintoism as its religion, and "converted" its script from kanji to katakana, with further nipponization of its culture, just as China weakened under the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) in its twilight years. This led to a further cultural estrangement between them, and a sense of superiority of Japan vis--vis China clearly emerged. Japan also spoke of protecting its "line of interests" (meaning Korea) in addition to its "line of sovereignty" during the first Japanese Imperial Parliament in 1900. This subsequently led to two humiliating Sino-Japanese Wars (1894-95 and 1931/37-1945) as well as Japan's rise as a "Western power" during and after the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War.
The "Nixon shock" in 1972 (of the United States normalizing relations with China) caught the Japanese polity by surprise, creating a political tussle between the Tanaka (pro-Beijing) and Fukuda (pro-Taiwan) political factions. But as geopolitics were shifting, Beijing also needed this reconciliation (according to Japanese researchers) to create a split within the Soviet bloc, amidst the Sino-Soviet schism.
Japanese Premiers Tanaka and Ohira were known to be pro-Beijing, whereas Fukuda favored Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Late Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping wanted the normalization to "rationalize" Beijing's relations with the United States and distance China from the Soviet Union. Socialist Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama then went the furthest in "apologizing" to China in 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, but the situation soured thereafter with the arrival of Junichiro Koizumi in Japan. Current Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe's landmark visit to Beijing also helped make an important contribution to rapprochement.
Dr Eric Teo Chu Cheow, a consultant and strategist, is Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore.