Strategic motivations at the core of the 16+1 initiative

Unlike the previous tao guang yang hui philosophy, or "hide brightness, nourish obscurity", China’s present foreign policy is an assertive one. This self-confidence, as is reflected by the Belt and Road Initiative, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, its leadership role in BRICS, its strategic partnerships and the 16+1 cCooperation platformmechanism.

As demonstrated by the "platform for connectivity" adopted at the China-European Union summit in June this year and the BRICS-plus format at the BRICS summit in Ufa in July 2015, the new Silk Roads are equivalent to bringing together countries and regions on a new track of cooperation for the benefit of all.

The 16+1 cCooperation can be best understood if analyzed in today’s global context. The world economy is undergoing tremendous changes, alongside changes shifts in the geopolitical and social orders. The pace of these changes has accelerated with the deeper and faster integration of the emerging economies into the global economy. The transformation of the "Arab Spring" into "Arab Winter", and the great divide between East and West over the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation have increased the risk of geopolitical conflicts. Fragmentation has become the norm, while cohesion remains an ideal. In this backgroundUnder these circumstances, China’s initiatives appear as a driving force of integration starting from Asia, continuing with Europe and Africa and ending with Latin America.

For China, culture and foreign policy are its main "soft power" tools. The 16+1 cCooperation literature underscores says China has so far concluded more than 50 strategic partnerships with countries and groups of countries around the world. In Europe, its strategic partners are France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Serbia, Ukraine, Poland, Ireland and Belarus. Of the CEE countries in the 16+1 cCooperation framework, only Serbia and Poland enjoy this status.

China’s ties with the 16 CEE countries are not in the strategic partnership category. Scholars are still debating whether the 16+1 cCooperation represents a "window of opportunity" or a "strategic opportunity". The literature also says underlines that the 16 CEE countries are seen by China as a "bridgehead" to the EU, which could be used for "further economic expan¬sion in Europe" and a "tool for building a positive image of China" in the region despite the rivalry between China, on one side, and Western Europe and the US, on the other that regard China as a "threat" to their established positions.

China’s efforts to strengthen cooperation with the 16 CEE countries are comparable with BRICS’ endeavours from an institutional standpoint, even though the economic and geopolitical scales of the two ambitious projects are incomparable. Through the first, China can gain influence in Europe. Through the second, it can expand its global role.

Therefore, this is a golden occasion for the 16 CEE countries to transform this window of opportunity into a strategic partnership with China.

Iulia Monica Oehler-Şincai, a senior research fellow at the Institute for World Economy of the Romanian Academy.