Pragmatism doesn’t mean some countries are ‘decoupling’ from ‘decoupling’

If you only skim the headlines, Beijing today can look like the Grand Central Station. Some Western presidents, prime ministers, commissioners and CEOs are lining up for meetings, handshakes and memoranda of cooperation. To some overly enthusiastic observers, this might signal the ebb of “de-risking”, the allies of the United States “decoupling” from “decoupling” or even cracks in the transatlantic alliance itself.

Indeed, on the one hand, these visits reflect the real needs of some countries for the Chinese market, stable expectations and multilateralism, and therefore represent a certain return to rationality in international relations.

On the other hand, what these visits also show is not a Western strategic turn toward China, but Western strategic adaptation. Some US allies are learning how to cooperate with China where they can, hedge where they must, and distance themselves where they believe their core interests — “security” and “values” — are at stake.

The transatlantic relationship has proven resilient precisely because it is not built on sentiment, but on binding pacts, institutional depth and "shared interests" that transcend any single US administration. NATO, the EU-US Trade and Technology Council and the Five Eyes intelligence framework are not loose political understandings; they are bureaucratic and operational systems with enormous inertia.

On security, the picture is even clearer. Despite Washington’s abrasive demands that allies spend more on defense, the European Union’s NATO members increased military outlays by 12 percent year-on-year, responding not to rhetoric but to hard “threats” — the Ukraine crisis and growing instability on Europe’s periphery. As then NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg put it, Article 5 is not a talking point; it is a legal commitment. Public opinion reinforces this structure: 85 percent of sampled Americans and Europeans still view the alliance as vital.

Against that backdrop, some Western leaders’ and senior officials’ visits to Beijing recently take on a different meaning. Some US allies are not abandoning “de-risking”; they are redefining it. In their eyes, “de-risking” was not about severing ties with China — an impossibility given China’s centrality to global supply chains — but about reducing “vulnerability” in strategic sectors. That logic remains firmly intact for some Western policymakers.

Indeed, recent history shows how precarious China’s agreements with some US allies can be when alliance pressure intensifies. Under US urging, the Netherlands reversed long-standing market commitments in order to restrict semiconductor cooperation with China, even invoking Cold War-era laws. The EU froze ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. Chinese tech companies have been excluded from European infrastructure projects after the TTC aligned transatlantic standards.

These reversals reveal a hard truth: economic cooperation with China is often conditional, reversible and politically fragile for some US allies. When US pressure rises, alliance discipline tends to prevail.

Nor should the US’ unilateralism be mistaken for the country’s “decline”. Paradoxically, it has often strengthened US centrality in many strategic fields through illegal means. The dollar still accounts for 56 percent of global reserves, dwarfing the euro. US Treasury bonds make up 60 percent of global safe-haven assets. Export controls and standard-setting have consolidated the US’ status in semiconductors and AI, where US companies hold roughly 40 percent of core patents. NATO allies now import about 70 percent of their weapons from the US, deepening technological dependence.

Even Europe’s frustration with the US’ climate policy underscores the point. The EU’s climate chief, who brushed aside the US’ backpedaling attempts in climate field, warned that US policies were pushing allies toward China. The bloc’s top diplomat also reiterated that transatlantic unity remains indispensable — lest China “laugh”. So the transatlantic tensions are real, but they are managed within the alliance, not outside it.

For China this is a long game. It will continue to strive to do its own economic and high-tech work well, keep its doors open to win-win cooperation, and consistently stand on the right side of history — on climate action, development, fairness and global governance reform.

The pragmatism of some US allies should not be mistaken for strategic convergence with China. The transatlantic alliance is not breaking up, and some Western countries’ cooperation with China will remain selective, contested and vulnerable to political shifts and US pressure. In today’s world, that is the new normal — and understanding that reality is the first step toward navigating it wisely.