COC entails collective efforts in interest of common good

Few rulemaking efforts in maritime affairs have tested the patience of negotiating parties as much as those regarding the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which have lasted for about 13 years. Yet that is one of the ways in which history moves forward, if only incrementally.

While the process of finalizing the COC has been slow, there are signs that momentum might be building up.

At a news conference on the sidelines of the annual gathering of China’s top legislature in Beijing on Sunday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said: “As we continue with the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, consultation on the COC has reached crunch time. All relevant parties look forward to wrapping it up this year.”

For too long, some external forces have tried to portray the South China Sea as a cauldron of conflict. Yet most regional countries see it as something closer to a complicated neighborhood — noisy at times, but still fundamentally under control if everyone agrees to certain house rules.

China has recently held maritime dialogues with several Southeast Asian neighbors — such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam — on issues ranging from fisheries to joint development. These are not the kind of meetings that make dramatic headlines, but they are the bolts that hold the machinery of regional stability together.

Beijing’s approach reflects China’s principled stance that the maritime disputes should be handled by the countries directly involved while China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations jointly safeguard stability.

It is a slow, incremental model of diplomacy. But then again, the South China Sea has proved that it is not a place that rewards rash moves. Enter the Philippines — the ASEAN chair in 2026 — which claims it wants the COC to explicitly reference the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

That position is not surprising. In recent years, it was under that cover that Manila has repeatedly provoked Beijing and strengthened “defense ties” with the United States and partners such as Japan and Australia in a bid to enforce its baseless territorial claims.

Still, diplomacy is rarely a purity test. It is more like a group project where everyone argues about the rules but eventually realizes that finishing the assignment is better than failing the exam. The COC is expected to provide the framework rules for all parties to effectively manage differences, build trust and advance cooperation.

That is where the Philippines’ role becomes important. As ASEAN chair, it faces a delicate balancing act: upholding its geopolitical commitment to Washington while helping prompt a consensus into the fold of regional frameworks.

In his remarks, Wang rightly urged the Philippines to “recognize and fulfill its responsibility” and resist the pull of narrow self-interest. Manila has no reason to ignore that message, because the stakes extend far beyond maritime maps.

That brings us to the uncomfortable lesson currently unfolding elsewhere in the world.

Look at the Middle East and Ukraine today, where geopolitical rivalries have turned entire regions into power game arenas. The South China Sea does not need to become another stage for such tragedies. If anything, it needs fewer megaphones and more result-oriented consultations.

The COC will not solve every dispute. No diplomatic document ever does. But it could provide what diplomats like to call “guardrails” — mechanisms for managing tensions and controlling risks.

In other words, it could turn the South China Sea from a headline into something far more valuable.

A routine.

And in geopolitics, routine is another word for peace and stability.

As Wang said, together with the parties directly concerned, China has the confidence and the resolve to remove interference, bridge differences, expand common ground and reach an agreement as soon as possible.