Zhai Haijun / For China Daily |
Foreigners' wariness frustrates China but it should not cast blame or conjure up conspiracies
In China, the Chinese Dream stirs hopes and sets expectations; internationally, it provokes questions and elicits concerns. Here I look outside China - exploring attitudes, suggesting responses and warning of the dangers of self-fulfilling prophecies.
President Xi Jinping's overarching vision of the Chinese Dream has become a grand driver of China's continuing reform and development. The Chinese Dream differs from the American Dream in that it expresses China's collective aspirations - "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (in Xi's words) - and it differs from the Chinese Dream in Chinese history by embracing the personal dreams of individual Chinese people for attaining happy, healthy, abundant and productive lives.
That the entire world derives material benefits from the Chinese Dream is apparent in a global economy. Higher standards of living mean greater consumption of goods and services in China, which works to create jobs and prosperity in a multiplier effect worldwide. China's commitment to science enables all peoples to share in China's success, often by making new technologies widely available at low costs.
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Some foreign media deemed it "no coincidence" that Xi first announced the Chinese Dream at the national museum in Tian'anmen Square - where an exhibition called "Road to Revival" portrayed China's oppression and humiliation at the hands of foreign powers and where China's new leader rehearsed how it had been the Communist Party of China that had restored China's sovereignty, integrity, dignity and pride.
In his speech "China's Challenge to American Hegemony", former US ambassador Charles W. Freeman Jr (the chief interpreter during President Richard Nixon's legendary trip to China in 1972) advises us "to see China as it is, not as we wish or fear it to be" nor as China itself may today sincerely proclaim. He argues: "China is inadvertently echoing the American isolationists of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The United States did not then seek to dominate or control the international state system, nor did it pursue military solutions to problems far from its shores. In time and in reaction to events, however, America came to do both."
Freeman concludes: "The more likely prospect is that China will take its place alongside the US and others at the head of a multilateral system of global governance. In such an oligarchic world order, China will have great prestige but no monopoly on power comparable to that which the US has recently enjoyed."