Takaichi walking tightrope of give and take in Washington amid geopolitical tensions: China Daily editorial
chinadaily.com.cn | Updated: 2026-03-19 20:15
There is a particular kind of diplomatic misfortune that arrives with a sudden change in circumstances, often with a bang. Before Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi boarded her government jet from Tokyo to Washington on Wednesday, she probably believed she was flying to star in a carefully choreographed debut in the United States. Instead, she has landed in the middle of someone else's war.
Takaichi's first US visit to meet the US president since she took office was meant to consolidate a familiar script: reaffirm the alliance, align on security and quietly trade Japanese investment for relief from US tariffs. It was, in short, meant to be transactional but predictable. Then came the attacks on Iran by the US and Israel and the US demand its allies provide help.
Suddenly, the centerpiece of the visit is not East Asia but the Strait of Hormuz — and the US leader's demand that US allies contribute naval escorts to secure it. For Japan, this is not merely inconvenient. It is legally and politically combustible. The country's postwar constraints, rooted in Article 9 of its Constitution, do not easily permit such deployments even if Tokyo is amenable. Takaichi's careful formulation — that Japan will do what its laws allow, and not what they do not — sounds less like a strategy than a careful tightrope walk.
It is unlikely to be received well. Washington's approach to alliances has always been less about security than leverage. In the US telling, Japan enjoys the benefits of US protection and should pay in kind when called upon. That payment need not come in ships. Takaichi will likely realize that her real mission in Washington is to offer something the US administration values more: money.
Here lies the second layer of her dilemma. Takaichi has staked much on her mission to revive Japan's military posture, loosening decades of postwar restraint under the banner of "collective self-defense". This agenda seems to dovetail neatly with US interests — not least because it translates into purchases of US defense systems. The alliance, in this reading, is as much an arms marketplace as a security pact.
But the US side, preoccupied with energy prices spiking toward around $100 a barrel and the domestic political fallout of a widening Middle East conflict, for once seems not in the mood for long transactions. Washington wants quick wins: investment, energy cooperation and tariff concessions that instantly favor the US economy. Takaichi, therefore, must sweeten the deal — likely by expanding Japan's already vast investment commitments in the US — in the hope of securing relief from tariffs that are biting into Japan's export-dependent economy.
This is a risky trade. If she returns to Tokyo with promises of more capital outflows but little in the way of tariff relief, she will face a backlash not only from Japanese corporations but also from a public already cooling on her leadership. The honeymoon is over. Approval ratings have slipped, and the optics of underwriting US industry while domestic costs rise are politically toxic.
Complicating matters further is the Middle East crisis itself. Japanese public opinion is overwhelmingly wary of the US-Israeli campaign against Iran, not least because Japan depends heavily on Middle Eastern energy supplies. To appear too eager to support Washington risks looking indifferent to Japan's own economic vulnerability. Yet to resist the US administration too openly risks fraying the alliance she has worked to strengthen.
This balancing act would test any leader. For Takaichi, it is particularly acute because her political brand has been closely tied to the US relationship. She cannot afford to look subservient. Nor can she afford to look estranged.
Takaichi continues to emphasize "regional threats" and Japan's right to "collective self-defense", but pushing too hard on "regional threats" in Washington would exacerbate the already fraught relations in East Asia. A tighter US-Japan military embrace will be the real threat to regional peace.
While not targeting a third party is supposedly a basic principle of the two countries' alliance, Japan, under the Takaichi government, pretends to be ignorant of that, as it is well aware that for the US strengthening the transactional value of its alliances always entails invoking third-party "villains". That is why Takaichi's visit to the US has raised broad concerns among Japan's neighbors.
Symbolism, too, will matter. Takaichi's visit to Arlington National Cemetery is intended to underscore so-called "shared sacrifice" and "common values" — Japan and the US both shed blood in World War II, yet they fought each other for utterly different values. Such gestures sit uneasily with Japan's unresolved historical memory. Paying tribute abroad while sidestepping regional sensitivities at home risks appearing less like reconciliation than selective remembrance.
In the end, Takaichi's Washington trip encapsulates a broader truth about US-led alliances: they are no longer anchored in shared strategy so much as negotiated in real time, under pressure, and often at a price. Japan finds itself deeply entwined with the US for security, yet increasingly exposed to the volatility of US decision-making, and it is the one that will pay the price.
For Takaichi, the challenge is to demonstrate that Japan can pursue its strategic interests without becoming hostage to them. That will require more than investment pledges, careful wording and flattering smiles. It will require a degree of autonomy that the lopsided alliance — and her own political calculations — makes hard to achieve.
In Washington this week, she is unlikely to find easy answers. Only sharper questions.





















