Von der Leyen out of step with reality

If distance alone determined alliances, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen might be forgiven for believing that Europe and Australia are natural strategic twins. "We couldn't be closer in how we see the world," she declared while celebrating the newly minted EU-Australia trade agreement. It is an appealing line. It is also, on closer inspection, wishful thinking.

The agreement itself is real enough. After eight years of negotiation, Brussels and Canberra have struck a deal that removes tariffs on more than 99 percent of EU exports, promising a boost in trade flows and opening the door to cooperation on critical minerals. Yet even here, the fine print tells a more complicated story. Australian farmers complain of meagre access; French producers fret about competition. Like many EU trade deals, it is less a grand strategic alignment than a carefully managed compromise among competing internal interests.

What is more revealing is the political framing that accompanies it. Von der Leyen has used the occasion not just to celebrate trade, but to advance a broader narrative: that the European Union and Australia must draw closer to reduce their dependence on China. It is a familiar refrain in Brussels. But it risks misunderstanding both the nature of global trade and the realities of Australia's economic and trade policy.

As the Anthony Albanese government has demonstrated, Canberra has learned from the policy mistakes of its predecessor. The previous government's alignment with the China policy of Washington brought relations with Beijing to a nadir, at considerable economic cost. The Albanese government has since opted for a more pragmatic recalibration, maintaining security ties with the United States — despite domestic doubts on the AUKUS nuclear deal — while stabilizing trade and economic ties with China, Australia's largest trade partner. It is a balancing act, not an ideological crusade.

Von der Leyen, by contrast, increasingly speaks in the language of ideological confrontation. Her warnings against "over-dependence" on China, when aired in a country having China as its largest trading partner, sound more like an invitation to choose sides. Precisely the choice Canberra is trying to avoid.

As Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said in reply to a question on Von der Leyen's China-related remarks in Australia at a news conference, trade is not a zero-sum contest but a two-way market choice. European companies operating in China generate profits that often return home, even as their exports are counted in China's surplus. Beijing, for its part, is seeking to expand imports and domestic demand, positioning itself not only as the "world's factory" but also as a "world market". These are arguments Europe would do well to weigh carefully rather than dismiss reflexively.

The deeper issue is one of consistency. The EU's own economic relationship with China remains substantial and, in many sectors, resilient. And multiple European leaders and senior officials have visited China in recent months and are scheduled to visit China in the near future, demonstrating their willingness to strengthen engagement.

At the same time, the EU continues to grapple with vulnerabilities closer to home — most notably in energy, where shocks from the Ukraine and Middle East crises have exposed structural dependencies. These are not problems that can plausibly be laid at China's door.

Yet Von der Leyen's rhetoric often targets China more readily than it interrogates Europe's own strategic choices. Her handling of transatlantic relations has drawn criticism within the EU, particularly over perceptions of acquiescence to Washington in trade disputes and geopolitical crises. The result is an uncomfortable asymmetry: Europe speaks the language of "strategic autonomy" while remaining heavily reliant on the US for security and, increasingly, for economic direction.

This is where the attempt to enlist Australia into a broader China-sceptical camp looks misplaced. Canberra's interests are not identical to the EU chief's. Nor are its constraints. For Australia, China is a concrete economic partner whose demand underpins key sectors of the economy

None of this is to argue against closer EU-Australia ties. On the contrary, deeper trade and investment links make sense in an uncertain world. But they should be built on mutual interest, not on an implicit expectation of alignment against a third party. To frame them otherwise risks turning economic cooperation into geopolitical signaling of bloc formation.

Von der Leyen would do well to recall that Europe's credibility as a global actor rests less on the slogans it exports than on the coherence it demonstrates at home. Strategic autonomy is not achieved by rhetoric, still less by projecting Europe's internal anxieties onto others. It requires the capacity to act independently — and the discipline to recognize when others will choose a different path.

Australia, it seems, has already made that choice. The EU should respect it.