World held to ransom by Middle East crisis: China Daily editorial

Demonstrating how energy markets can be weaponized with just a threat of blockade, the Houthi seizure of positions on Greater and Lesser Hanish this month was more than a symbolic victory. The islands lie near Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow passage linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Together with Mokha and Perim, they could help the organization threaten one of Saudi Arabia's remaining oil-export routes. Days earlier, a drone attack had damaged the East-West Pipeline, which carries Saudi crude to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, pushing oil prices to a new high.

This is the logic of the "twin-choke-point" strategy of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Houthi campaign serves multiple purposes, as the conflicts in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the Gulf are increasingly interconnected, with developments on one front affecting calculations on the others.

With the midterm elections approaching in the United States, the US administration has little appetite for another military commitment in Yemen. It wants to contain Iran without triggering an oil shock or opening a new conflict. When Riyadh reportedly sought US assistance, Washington offered intelligence and a limited number of noncombat personnel, but no direct intervention. That looks more like paralysis than restraint: The US administration is avoiding the immediate political costs of action.

Although the US imports relatively little Gulf oil directly, a new crisis that begins in the Red Sea can eventually reach US petrol stations, factories and supermarkets. That Washington recognizes these risks yet still avoids intervention reveals the strength of domestic political constraints. The midterm calendar has become an invisible actor in the US' Middle East strategy.

Saudi Arabia's security pact with Turkiye and Pakistan has exposed the gap between diplomatic solidarity and operational commitment.

Israel, meanwhile, is a quiet beneficiary of the disorder. Its military operations in Lebanon and Syria, and its efforts to expand security zones around Gaza and Damascus, unfold as Iran's partners face pressure and their networks are disrupted.

Yet tactical advantage is not strategic success. Israel's larger aims, including permanently neutralizing Iran's nuclear capabilities or reshaping its political system, remain unattained. Territorial expansion may create symbolic buffers, but it cannot produce legitimacy or lasting security. Nor can reliance on a US security shield guarantee that the shield will always hold.

Put together this is neorealism in its harshest form: states and armed groups pursuing short-term benefits, enlarging spheres of influence and presenting coercion as deterrence. But none of the parties truly profits in the long run, as none of their immediate tactical gains is sustainable, defensible or conducive to lasting peace and strategic stability in the region.

The Middle East is not a chessboard on which choke points can be exchanged indefinitely. It is home to hundreds of millions of people whose grievances — above all the unresolved Palestinian question — cannot be bombed, blockaded or postponed into silence.

Israel eggs the US on to stir the pot. Regional powers that cannot beat or rely on the US take it out on each other. The US cannot reopen the strait, so the US put another lock on it. This is a true portrait of international politics stuck at a low ebb. Political resolve, strategic vision and diplomatic wisdom have become scarce commodities in this region's endless geopolitical struggle.

Beijing has been consistent in calling on all related parties to end the hostilities and resolve the conflicts through negotiations.

Regional countries should take charge of their own security, reject external interference, build a new security architecture through dialogue and consultation, and treat development as the foundation of stability. The UN Charter and international law should provide the rules, while the Palestinian question must remain central. A two-state solution remains the indispensable political horizon.

This is not a quick fix. But it starts from a necessary premise: control of a strait is not the same as order, and coercion is not the same as security. Unless the parties pursue political settlement, a comprehensive ceasefire, reconstruction and renewed trust, the twin straits will remain hostages to whoever controls the nearest island — and the world economy will continue paying the ransom.