US pressing others to help reopen Hormuz is to socialize liability of its self-made trouble: China Daily editorial

History's recurring lesson is that great powers often mistake ultimatums for rational strategy. The Middle East crisis offers another tutorial on that error.

United States Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has pressed allies in Europe and Asia to contribute to a US-led effort to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that nations dependent on Gulf energy should shoulder more of the burden. Reports also described internal discussions in Washington of punitive measures against NATO members, including the United Kingdom and Spain, reluctant to align with the US' Middle East course.

This reveals less confidence than advertised. When the US administration begins demanding that allies underwrite an emergency of its own making, it is socializing liability. Washington would prefer to convert a failure of policy into a universal obligation. The pattern is familiar: first, strategic indulgence of an ally's maximalism; second, regional escalation; third, an appeal to shared needs; fourth, invoices sent to friends.

Now comes the claim that the US is the "guardian" of world energy security. There is an irony here. The US presents its policing of the Strait of Hormuz as an altruistic act, arguing that it does not need Gulf oil itself.

The US may import less crude oil. But it cannot insulate itself from prices set in global markets. A closure of the Strait of Hormuz would raise costs for consumers, roil equities, elevate inflation expectations and imperil growth in the US as well as elsewhere. Interdependence is stubbornly indifferent to slogans. Hence Washington's urgency. And why Washington has not held back from publicly stating that controlling Iran's oil is among its key objectives.

Iran, meanwhile, has behaved with the patience of an actor accustomed to pressure. After absorbing the initial blows — military, economic, rhetorical — it has demonstrated resilience and an ability to husband limited means for strategic leverage. Tehran has articulated terms for talks: ceasefire arrangements, sanctions relief and reciprocal guarantees rather than unilateral submission.

That Israel has shown willingness to suspend attacks on Lebanon, while space is created for US-Iran diplomacy, suggests where the decisive pressure lies. It is not a sudden conversion to moderation. It is Washington's realization that the economics of prolonged confrontation are intolerable.

As the US is already navigating debt, inflation anxieties and electoral and domestic tensions, as evidenced by the intruder alert during the White House Correspondents' Dinner on Saturday, it cannot serenely preside over an oil shock severe enough to induce a global recession.

In Washington, some like to talk morality until the arithmetic interrupts.

The US administration's own behavior betrays this understanding. Reports of US participation in measures tightening the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz — whether through escalatory naval postures, interdictions or coercive signaling designed to intimidate Tehran — are not displays of strength. They are gestures of panic.

Such conduct also confuses deterrence with drama. Iran is not likely to be bullied into capitulation by the US administration's demonstrations that simultaneously injure US allies, global markets and its domestic political standing. Deterrence requires credible ends matched by coherent means. What is the end here? Tactical humiliation? Temporary maritime passage? A revised regional order? Washington's statements oscillate among them.

Strategists warn of the danger of allowing so-called moralism of "safeguarding" global energy security to substitute for rational policy. The Middle East is where this temptation becomes chronic. The instigators of the conflict speak in absolutes while maneuvering for increments. Israel invokes survival while stretching the perimeter of conflict. The US invokes order while creating disorder.

The US allies now being urged to join the latest US maritime enterprise should ask themselves the simple question: to what end, at what cost, and under whose design? Alliances are not indentures. Despite its offensive nature, NATO was originally created to defend the so-called North Atlantic community, not to serve as a collection agency for every strategic overreach by the US.

The wiser course is immediate de-escalation, restoration of secure navigation through negotiated arrangements and talks grounded in reciprocal concessions rather than fantasies of unconditional victory. The Strait of Hormuz is too consequential to be converted into a stage for macho theatrics.

How was the Strait of Hormuz closed? Answering that question correctly is essential to any effort aimed at reopening it.