Brussels' 'rivalry rhetoric' on China meets economic reality

If Brussels' latest position paper is to be believed, China has crossed a diplomatic Rubicon. By describing Beijing as a "key enabler" of Russia's conflict with Ukraine and placing it alongside Moscow as a "revisionist power" seeking to "reshape" the international order, the European Union has adopted tough official language on China.

The timing of the EU's rhetorical escalation is hardly accidental. After more than four years of conflict, the Ukraine crisis has entered a phase when military gains or losses over the coming months could influence not only the settlement but also Europe's own security architecture. Against that backdrop, the position paper adopted by the EU's 27 foreign ministers on Monday serves less as a legal judgment than as political signaling designed to increase the costs of any so-called "Chinese support" for Moscow.

Yet if Europe's language has become more uncompromising, its economic behavior remains comparatively restrained, reflecting an uncomfortable reality. Brussels may speak of "de-risking", but every attempt by Europe's China hawks to widen trade restrictions eventually encounters resistance from within the bloc itself.

Member states differ sharply over how much economic pain they are willing to bear. European manufacturers worry about access to rare earths, pharmaceutical ingredients and intermediate goods. Consumers ultimately pay for higher tariffs through higher prices. Businesses bear the costs of disrupted supply chains.

Even while European Commission officials warn against Chinese "industrial dominance", both sides have established working mechanisms, agreed on joint monitoring and scheduled future talks.

The first round of consultations in Brussels last month produced a pragmatic direction: the two sides should explore ways to expand the EU's exports to China. That is a far more rational approach. Reducing its dependence on China may narrow the EU's trade deficit, but much of the resulting burden falls on European households and companies through higher costs and reduced competitiveness.

European policymakers frequently argue that China should purchase more European products. Beijing, for its part, has indicated a willingness to import more competitive European goods. Yet the sectors where Europe still enjoys its technological advantages — advanced semiconductor equipment, precision machinery and other high-end industrial technologies — remain constrained by European export controls under the banner of "dual-use security".

Europe cannot simultaneously complain about its trade deficit while refusing to sell many of the products that Chinese buyers actually want.

If Brussels genuinely wishes to reduce the deficit, carefully loosening restrictions on selected civilian high-tech exports would achieve far more than another round of "anti-dumping" and "anti-subsidy" investigations. The EU's trade deficit with China is actually rooted in a "trust deficit" of its own making.

The European Commission is reportedly assembling a task force to prepare for possible Chinese "retaliation" while devising compensation for European companies that might suffer the consequences. Unveiling such contingency plans before negotiations have even run their course risks sending a contradictory signal. Is Brussels preparing for compromise or rehearsing confrontation? If the purpose of the consultations is to find common ground, they should be conducted on the basis of mutual respect, equality and good faith — not accompanied by side shows designed to shape the negotiating climate before the real bargaining has begun.

Europe can either continue allowing false geopolitical anxieties to dominate every aspect of its China policy, risking an increasingly costly cycle of confrontation. Or it can distinguish between legitimate security concerns and areas where cooperation remains overwhelmingly in its own interest.

Had China supported Russia as some of Europe's most "outspoken" politicians regularly imply, the battlefield would almost certainly look very different today. Instead, the conflict has settled into a prolonged and costly stalemate, exposing Europe's own strategic miscalculations.

Before assigning ever greater responsibility to Beijing for Europe's security dilemmas, Brussels should ask a more uncomfortable question: how much of its current predicament stems from decisions made in Europe itself?

Statesmanship begins with that kind of self-examination. The future China-EU trade consultations will reveal whether Brussels possesses the political wisdom to match its strategic ambition.